INTELLECTUALISM ABOUT KNOWLEDGE HOW AND SLIPS

This paper argues that slips present a problem for reductive intellectualism. Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011, 2013; Brogaard 2011) argue that knowledge how is a form of knowledge that. Consequently, knowledge how must have the same epistemic properties a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cathrine V. FELIX
Format: Article
Language:German
Published: Babeș-Bolyai University 2020-12-01
Series:Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia
Subjects:
Online Access:https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/2614
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