Managerial conflict of interests effects on duopoly market structure
Background: Principal-agent problem has been discussed intensively in the recent decade, but this specific case has not yet been analyzed in this manner; one of two companies in Cournot duopoly employs a manager who has a partial ownership of the second company, but without executive power in that c...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Novi Sad - Faculty of Economics, Subotica
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Strategic Management |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/1821-3448/2025/1821-34482502049V.pdf |
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