Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation
In the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also r...
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MDPI AG
2025-07-01
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| author | Liping Wang Zhonghao Ye Tongtong Lei Kaiyue Liu Chuang Li |
| author_facet | Liping Wang Zhonghao Ye Tongtong Lei Kaiyue Liu Chuang Li |
| author_sort | Liping Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also requires tripartite cooperation between the government, enterprises and the public to jointly promote the popularization and practice of the low-carbon consumption concept. Therefore, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, this study deeply discusses the mechanism of government policy on the strategy choice of logistics enterprises. The stability strategy and satisfying conditions are deeply analyzed by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the logistics industry, government, and consumers. With the help of MATLAB R2023b simulation analysis, the following key conclusions are drawn: (1) The strategic choice of logistics enterprises is affected by various government policies, including research and development intensity, construction intensity, and punishment intensity. These government policies and measures guide logistics enterprises toward low-carbon development. (2) The government’s research, development, and punishment intensity are vital in determining whether logistics enterprises adopt low-carbon strategies. R&D efforts incentivize logistics companies to adopt low-carbon technologies by driving technological innovation and reducing costs. The penalties include economic sanctions to restrain companies that do not comply with low-carbon standards. In contrast, construction intensity mainly affects the consumption behavior of consumers and then indirectly affects the strategic choice of logistics enterprises through market demand. (3) Although the government’s active supervision is a necessary guarantee for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategies, more is needed. This means that in addition to the government’s policy support, it also needs the active efforts of the logistics enterprises themselves and the improvement of the market mechanism to promote the low-carbon development of the logistics industry jointly. This study quantifies the impact of different factors on the system’s evolution, providing a precise decision-making basis for policymakers and helping promote the logistics industry’s and consumers’ low-carbon transition. It also provides theoretical support for the logistics industry’s low-carbon development and green low-carbon consumption and essential guidance for sustainable development. |
| format | Article |
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| institution | Matheson Library |
| issn | 2079-8954 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
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| series | Systems |
| spelling | doaj-art-811a4b3d0e5e43aab0d900a99f7d6c922025-07-25T13:37:11ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542025-07-0113759010.3390/systems13070590Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game SimulationLiping Wang0Zhonghao Ye1Tongtong Lei2Kaiyue Liu3Chuang Li4Finance and Economics College, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, ChinaFinance and Economics College, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, ChinaIn the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also requires tripartite cooperation between the government, enterprises and the public to jointly promote the popularization and practice of the low-carbon consumption concept. Therefore, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, this study deeply discusses the mechanism of government policy on the strategy choice of logistics enterprises. The stability strategy and satisfying conditions are deeply analyzed by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the logistics industry, government, and consumers. With the help of MATLAB R2023b simulation analysis, the following key conclusions are drawn: (1) The strategic choice of logistics enterprises is affected by various government policies, including research and development intensity, construction intensity, and punishment intensity. These government policies and measures guide logistics enterprises toward low-carbon development. (2) The government’s research, development, and punishment intensity are vital in determining whether logistics enterprises adopt low-carbon strategies. R&D efforts incentivize logistics companies to adopt low-carbon technologies by driving technological innovation and reducing costs. The penalties include economic sanctions to restrain companies that do not comply with low-carbon standards. In contrast, construction intensity mainly affects the consumption behavior of consumers and then indirectly affects the strategic choice of logistics enterprises through market demand. (3) Although the government’s active supervision is a necessary guarantee for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategies, more is needed. This means that in addition to the government’s policy support, it also needs the active efforts of the logistics enterprises themselves and the improvement of the market mechanism to promote the low-carbon development of the logistics industry jointly. This study quantifies the impact of different factors on the system’s evolution, providing a precise decision-making basis for policymakers and helping promote the logistics industry’s and consumers’ low-carbon transition. It also provides theoretical support for the logistics industry’s low-carbon development and green low-carbon consumption and essential guidance for sustainable development.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/7/590logistics industrylow-carbon developmentgreen and low-carbon consumptionevolutionary gamesimulation analysis |
| spellingShingle | Liping Wang Zhonghao Ye Tongtong Lei Kaiyue Liu Chuang Li Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation Systems logistics industry low-carbon development green and low-carbon consumption evolutionary game simulation analysis |
| title | Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation |
| title_full | Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation |
| title_fullStr | Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation |
| title_short | Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation |
| title_sort | green and low carbon strategy of logistics enterprises under dual carbon a tripartite evolutionary game simulation |
| topic | logistics industry low-carbon development green and low-carbon consumption evolutionary game simulation analysis |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/7/590 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lipingwang greenandlowcarbonstrategyoflogisticsenterprisesunderdualcarbonatripartiteevolutionarygamesimulation AT zhonghaoye greenandlowcarbonstrategyoflogisticsenterprisesunderdualcarbonatripartiteevolutionarygamesimulation AT tongtonglei greenandlowcarbonstrategyoflogisticsenterprisesunderdualcarbonatripartiteevolutionarygamesimulation AT kaiyueliu greenandlowcarbonstrategyoflogisticsenterprisesunderdualcarbonatripartiteevolutionarygamesimulation AT chuangli greenandlowcarbonstrategyoflogisticsenterprisesunderdualcarbonatripartiteevolutionarygamesimulation |