Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure”
There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Processual Penal
2023-03-01
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| Series: | Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal |
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| Online Access: | https://revista.ibraspp.com.br/RBDPP/article/view/821 |
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| author | Andrés Páez Janaina Matida |
| author_facet | Andrés Páez Janaina Matida |
| author_sort | Andrés Páez |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4f4e961eb2f34fb381f5b6f3b6481b5e |
| institution | Matheson Library |
| issn | 2525-510X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-03-01 |
| publisher | Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Processual Penal |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal |
| spelling | doaj-art-4f4e961eb2f34fb381f5b6f3b6481b5e2025-08-02T07:38:58ZengInstituto Brasileiro de Direito Processual PenalRevista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal2525-510X2023-03-019110.22197/rbdpp.v9i1.8211178Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure”Andrés Páez0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4602-7490Janaina Matida1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0963-1848Universidad de los Andes, BogotáUniversidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago de ChileThere is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it.https://revista.ibraspp.com.br/RBDPP/article/view/821testimonial injusticehermeneutical injusticejudicial partialityidentity prejudiceracial discriminationsexual discrimination |
| spellingShingle | Andrés Páez Janaina Matida Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal testimonial injustice hermeneutical injustice judicial partiality identity prejudice racial discrimination sexual discrimination |
| title | Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” |
| title_full | Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” |
| title_fullStr | Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” |
| title_full_unstemmed | Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” |
| title_short | Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure” |
| title_sort | editorial of dossier epistemic injustice in criminal procedure |
| topic | testimonial injustice hermeneutical injustice judicial partiality identity prejudice racial discrimination sexual discrimination |
| url | https://revista.ibraspp.com.br/RBDPP/article/view/821 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT andrespaez editorialofdossierepistemicinjusticeincriminalprocedure AT janainamatida editorialofdossierepistemicinjusticeincriminalprocedure |